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Agri-Environmental Program Compliance in a Heterogeneous Landscape 
 
Abstract 
Heterogeneity of agricultural landscapes may necessitate the use of spatially targeted 
instrument combinations to implement the social optimum.  But compliance with these 
policies may require costly enforcement.  This paper examines the design of agri-
environmental policies featuring two of the most commonly used instruments, reductions 
in fertilizer application rates and installation of riparian buffers.  While compliance with 
buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost, fertilizer application is only 
verifiable through costly monitoring.  We derive optimal subsidies for fertilizer reduction 
and buffer strip set-asides and enforcement strategies for the cases of low and excessive 
monitoring costs.  An empirical simulation model suggests that enforceable policies can 
come close to replicating socially optimal crop production, nitrogen runoff, and overall 
welfare without requiring increases in overall subsidy expenditures, at least under 
conditions characteristic of Scandinavia.  Sensitivity analysis suggests that these 
conclusions may carry over to areas with higher overall land quality as well. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is a growing interest in reformulating agricultural policies of the European Union in 
ways that reflect the multifunctional aspects of agriculture. This entails encouraging the 
provision of positive environmental services (e.g., scenic landscapes, wildlife habitat, 
cultural heritage) and discouraging  the provision of negative ones (e.g., water quality 
impairment from fertilizers, sediment, and pesticides) (OECD 2003a). This tendency is 
especially transparent in the EU’s recent Mid-Term Review 2003 policy reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  This policy reform introduced the Single Farm 
Payment (SFP) scheme, in which most of the direct payments under CAP were decoupled 
from production and paid in a single, lump-sum farm payment based on 2000–2002 
historical production levels. As a precondition to obtain SFP, farmers must meet certain 
environmental cross-compliance requirements.  The Mid-Term Review also introduced so 
called modulation, in which the EU’s funds will be shifted from direct aids and market 
support to more targeted rural development and agri-environmental policy measures. 
 
In sum, the CAP is being restructured towards more decoupled income support payments 
with environmental cross-compliance requirements, and towards more targeted and 
differentiated agri-environmental payment programs. For instance, in order to reduce 
nutrient runoff from field parcels many EU countries implement fertilizer use reduction 
measures and/or buffer strips as a part of either environmental cross-compliance criteria or 
as a criteria in more targeted agri-environmental payment programs (for general overview 
see e.g. OECD 2003b). 
 
Refinements of agricultural and agri-environmental policies create new problems, 
however. The more targeted and differentiated instruments are, the harder it is to achieve 
compliance, necessitating an increased enforcement effort. Available policy instruments 
provide a range of measures from those that are difficult to monitor and enforce to those 
that are relatively easy to verify and enforce. Consider for example the case of fertilizer 
use reduction and riparian buffer strip requirements, mentioned above. Variability in 
yields due to land quality, weather, varietal choice, timing of application, and similar 
factors make it impossible to determine compliance with fertilizer reduction requirements 
without soil testing. A uniform riparian buffer is enforceable at low costs. However,   4
problem of enforcement is present when it is optimal to differentiate buffer strip 
requirements according to land quality and the latter is not observable at negligible cost.  
Soil testing is expensive, so that efficient monitoring and enforcement schemes have at 
least the potential of lowering implementation costs significantly. 
 
Enforcement can be an especially significant obstacle to effective implementation of agri-
environmental requirements and policies. The environmental compliance requirements 
that accompany income support measures (environmental cross compliance) or agri-
environmental payments (direct compliance) are not self-enforcing.  There is no automatic 
verification.  Variations in output can be due to microclimate, managerial ability, or other 
factors that cannot be disentangled from cheating on environmental compliance without 
on-site monitoring.  Agri-environmental compliance typically has no effect on the quality 
of output, either.  These measures are costly for farmers because they reduce agricultural 
productivity, giving farmers a clear incentive to cheat by falsely claiming to have 
implemented them.  Compliance monitoring is costly, making it important to devise 
efficient compliance monitoring schemes to ensure that agri-environmental policy goals 
are met. 
 
The problem of how governments should design compliance monitoring strategies when 
environmental compliance requirements are not self-enforcing has been analyzed in 
economics since Becker’s seminal work (1968); Polinsky and Shavell (2000) survey 
applications to public policy. Downing and Watson (1974), Harford (1978), (1987) and 
Malik (1992) introduced the topics of noncompliance and costly-enforcement to 
environmental economics (for recent advances, see Sandmo 2002; Rousseau and Prost 
2005 provide an interesting case study).  In the context of agri-environmental policy, Choe 
and Fraser (1999) derive optimal monitoring strategies and incentive payments when 
farmers can exert either low or high compliance effort and monitoring is costly.  Kampas 
and White (2004) examine the impacts of monitoring costs the relative efficiency of 
alternative agri-environmental policy mechanisms.  Fraser (2002, 2004) investigates the 
effects of penalties for non-compliance but does not consider monitoring costs. 
 
This paper examines the optimal design of agri-environmental policies featuring two of 
the most commonly used compliance requirements, reductions in fertilizer application 
rates and installation of riparian buffers, which differ in terms of compliance monitoring   5
cost as well as efficacy.  In contrast to Choe and Fraser (1999), we assume a continuum of 
land quality (and thus types of agents).  We assume that land quality is perfectly 
observable at negligible cost, so that compliance with one component of environmental 
compliance, buffer strip requirements, is verifiable at negligible cost. This assumption 
reflects the fact that the current Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) in 
the EU allows monitoring of land use and thereby crop area payments at low cost.
1  For 
the other component of environmental compliance, restrictions on fertilizer application, 
we employ two alternative assumptions. In the first case, fertilizer application is verifiable 
through costly monitoring. In the second, it is non-verifiable or verifiable only at 
excessive cost.
2 In this latter case, buffer strip requirements and associated payments are 
the only enforceable policy instrument. We extend the conceptual framework of 
Lichtenberg (2002, 2004) and Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003) to encompass these 
efficient monitoring strategies given realistic limits on penalties. We then apply that 
framework empirically using an empirical model reflecting Finnish agricultural and 
environmental conditions. 
 
2.  Land Allocation, Crop Production, and Runoff in a Heterogeneous Region 
 
We use as a baseline the Ricardian model of Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003) that 
considers agricultural production in a region with heterogeneous land quality where farms 
are located along a river that drains the area. The land is divided into parcels which are of 
the same size and homogeneous in land quality (see Figure 1). Land quality differs over 
parcels and is ranked by a scalar measure q, with the scale chosen so that minimal land 
quality is zero and maximal land quality is one, i.e.,  1 0 ≤ ≤ q .  Let G(q) denote the 
cumulative distribution of q (acreage having quality q at most), while g(q) is its density. It 
is further assumed that g(q) is continuous and differentiable.  The total amount of land in 
the region is G(1). 
 
It is assumed for simplicity that there are only two crops grown in this region,  2 , 1 = j , 
both crops produced under constant returns to scale technologies with crop 1 better suited 
                                                            
1  For instance, a recent empirical studies by Rorstad et al. (2007) and Ollikainen et al. (2007) show that in 
both Norway and in Finland the transaction costs related to crop area payments are less than 2% of the 
amount of subsidies paid.  
2  This is supported, for instance, in Ollikainen et al. (2007) who find that although more than 30% of the 
transaction costs accruing from agri-environmental payments are devoted to actual monitoring, the success 
achieved in controlling nutrient runoff is still very modest.   6
to lower quality land.  Output of each crop per unit of land area, yj, is a function of land 
quality  q and the fertilizer application rate (fertilizer per unit of land area) lj, 
) ; ( q l f y j
j
j = .  The production function is increasing and concave in fertilizer and land 
quality, that is,  0 ) ; ( > q l f j
j
l , 0 ) ; ( < q l f j
j
ll ,  0 ) ; ( > q l f j
j
q ,  0 ) ; ( < q l f j
j
qq .  Let pj and c 
denote the respective prices of crops and fertilizer and χj all other production costs per unit 
of land area for crop j.  Let Lj(q) denote the share of land of quality q allocated to use j. 
 
Crop production generates negative environmental externalities via nutrient runoff.  We 
assume that runoff for each parcel of land is a function  )) ( ), ( )) ( 1 (( q m q l q m v j j j j −  that 
depends on the crop, j, the amount of fertilizer applied to the parcel, (1-mj(q))lj(q), and the 
share of the parcel devoted to the buffer strip, mj(q).  For convenience, runoff from the 
residual use is assumed to be zero.  Assume that runoff is uniformly mixed in the river, so 
that pollution damage depends on aggregate runoff, Z = 




1 ) ( ) ( )) ( ), ( )) ( 1 ((
j j j j j j dq q g q L q m q l q m v .  Let D(Z) denote the convex cost of 
damage from runoff ( 0 ) ( ' ' ; 0 ) ( ' > ⋅ > ⋅ D D ) in the watershed and γ the cost of establishing a 
buffer strip per unit of land area. 
 
Land in agriculture also generates positive externalities in terms of open space, 
preservation of landscapes of important cultural significance, and similar environmental 
services.  Let Aj(q) denote the marginal value of these environmental services generated 
per unit of land of quality q allocated to crop j (inclusive of the share allocated to buffer 
strips). 
 
The social welfare maximization problem can now be expressed as 
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Let  ζ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the runoff (Z) constraint, and δ the   7
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint 1 ) ( ) ( 2 1 ≤ + q L q L .  Then the first order 
conditions defining the optimal use of fertilizer, the size of the buffer strip and allocation 
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plus the constraints (2). 
 
Under certain regularity assumptions (intuitively, that crop 2 is more profitable at land of 
maximal quality and more responsive to changes in land quality), condition (3c) also 
defines a unique critical quality, 
c q , defined by 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
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at which the land allocation switches from one crop to another (see for example 
Lichtenberg 2002).  Land of quality 0 ≤ q < q
c is allocated to crop 1; land of quality q ≥ q
c 
is allocated to crop 2; and, as Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003) show, the optimal buffer 
strip area for each crop decreases in land quality. 
 
In the absence of government intervention farmers’ decisions do not take into account 
either negative (runoff) or positive (landscape) externalities from agriculture.  It is easy to 
see from condition (3b) that farmers will not maintain buffer strips in such cases because 
they receive no compensation for the lost rent (hence condition (3b) holds as a strict 
inequality).  The privately optimal fertilizer application rate similarly ignores marginal 
runoff damage while land of each quality is allocated to the use that generates the highest 
rent without consideration of runoff damage or landscape benefits, hence the critical 
quality of land will be lower than the social optimum (see Lichtenberg 2002 and Lankoski 
and Ollikainen 2003). 
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3. Agri-Environmental Program Compliance with Costly Monitoring 
 
The problem of agri-environmental policy is to find instruments that induce farmers to 
reduce fertilizer application rates, to establish buffer strips, and to adjust the allocation of 
land among alternative uses towards the social optimum.  Conditions (1a)-(1e) indicate 
that the first-best choice of such agri-environmental policies entails a spatially targeted 
combination of a fertilizer tax (or subsidy for reducing fertilizer use) and a buffer strip 
subsidy. It seems reasonable to assume that spatially differentiated buffer strip 
requirements and corresponding subsidies can be enforced at low cost: Most countries 
have detailed soil surveys that allow them to devise spatially differentiated buffer strip 
requirements and buffer strip planting is easily verified by annual aerial surveillance or 
similarly low-cost forms of remote sensing. In contrast, enforcement of fertilizer taxes, 
subsidies, and/or restrictions on fertilizer use is problematic. First-best spatially 
differentiated fertilizer taxes or subsidized restrictions on fertilizer use are unenforceable 
without costly monitoring—and may be completely unenforceable if reliable soil testing 
methods are not available—while second-best differentiated fertilizer taxes and subsidies 
designed to induce farmers to report their private knowledge of fertilizer application rates 
truthfully are not self-enforcing due to the ease with which secondary markets can be 
established (Lichtenberg 2002). 
 
In what follows, we extend the conceptual framework presented in the preceding section 
to model the kinds of agri-environmental program compliance policies currently used in 
Europe for reducing nutrient runoff in two situations: (1) when fertilizer use is verifiable 
through costly monitoring and (2) when fertilizer use is either non-verifiable or verifiable 
only at excessive cost, so that buffer strip requirements and associated subsidies are the 
only enforceable policy instrument.  We assume that land quality is perfectly observable at 
negligible cost (e.g., because soils have already been mapped or where farmers have been 
required to report indicators of soil quality such as soil characteristics, yields, etc.) and 
that compliance with buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost (e.g., by 
annual aerial surveillance). 
 
3.1. Fertilizer Use Verifiable with Costly Monitoring 
   9
Farmers receive three types of direct payments under existing policy regimes in Europe: a 
subsidy bj(mj,q)mj for planting a buffer strip of size mj on land of quality q allocated to 
crop j, where the unit buffer subsidy schedule bj varies according to buffer strip size but is 
fixed in advance by the government; an area payment tj(q) for land of quality q allocated 
to crop j (excluding buffer strips); and, when applicable, a subsidy for complying with 
restrictions on fertilizer use sj(q)[lj
u(q)-lj(q)], where lj
u denotes unregulated fertilizer use. 
 
Suppose that fertilizer use is perfectly verifiable through an annual soil test costing T  per 
unit of land area and, as is commonly the case, that the penalty for being found non-
compliant with fertilizer restrictions equals the loss of all subsidy payments.  Farmers are 
assumed to be risk neutral, hence the threat of detection can be sufficient to ensure perfect 
compliance.  We know that the farmer will be indifferent between cheating and complying 
if the expected return from cheating equals the certain return from compliance.  Thus, the 
minimum inspection probability needed to ensure compliance from a farmer growing crop 
j on land of quality q is 
{}
[] ) ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) , (
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) , ( [ )] ( 1 [
) (
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Faced with such an inspection probability, the farmer will always comply and thus choose 
fertilizer, buffer strip size, and land allocation for crop j on land of quality q as defined by 
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j
l j      ( 5 a )  




j γ χ  (5b) 
{ }
0 ) ( ) ( ] ) ( [
) ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [
≤ − − +
+ − + − −
q q m q b








.   (5c) 
The socially optimal allocation of land between the two crops can be attained by 
restricting total agri-environmental subsidy payments per unit of land [1-
mj(q)]{sj(q)[lj
u(q)-lj(q)]+tj(q)}+bj(mj,q)mj(q) to the marginal value of positive 
environmental services generated by land of quality q allocated to crop j, Aj(q).  In what 
follows, we impose this restriction on total subsidy payments, so that the the minimum 
inspection probability needed to ensure compliance from a farmer growing crop j on land 
of quality q is 
{}
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The government’s optimization problem in this case is choosing fertilizer use, buffer strip 
size, total runoff, land allocation to maximize the value of agricultural output and 
environmental services generated by land in each crop (inclusive of buffer strips) net of 
runoff damage and enforcement costs subject to constraints on total runoff and land 
availability: 
dq q g q L q A q m
q A
T q cl q q l f p q m
Z D
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subject to constraints (2). 
 
The optimal fertilizer subsidy rate sj(q), buffer strip subsidy rate bj(q), and area payment 
tj(q) can then be derived by equating the government’s optimization conditions with 
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(7b) 
It is readily apparent from a comparison of equations (7a) and (7b) with equations (3a) and 
(3b) that the presence of enforcement costs induces the government to rely less on 
reductions in fertilizer use and more on buffer strip requirements than is socially optimal.  
The fertilizer subsidy equals marginal runoff damage from fertilizer use discounted by an 
enforcement cost factor.  The fertilizer subsidy is less than the marginal runoff damage as 
a result, so that fertilizer use will exceed the social optimum for each crop on each quality 
of land.  The buffer strip subsidy equals marginal runoff damage avoided plus the avoided 
expected inspection cost and the savings from lower fertilizer subsidy and area payments.  
The buffer subsidy exceeds avoided marginal runoff damage as a result, so that buffer 
strips will be larger than the social optimum for each crop on each quality of land.   11
 
Finally, the constraint on total subsidy payments 
{ } ) ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( ) ( q t q l q l q s q m q m q b q A j j
u
j j j j j j + − − + =  (7c) 
can be used together with equation (7b) to solve for the buffer subsidy and area payment 
the government should offer for each crop on each quality of land. 
 
3.2. Soil Quality Observable, Fertilizer Use Unverifiable 
 
Now suppose that fertilizer use is unverifiable by soil tests, e.g., because soil tests are 
insufficiently accurate to determine fertilizer use reliably, or, equivalently, that soil testing 
is just too expensive to be worthwhile. In such cases the government will need to rely on 
buffer strips alone to address problems of nutrient runoff.  Assume as before that the cost 
of compliance monitoring for buffer strips is negligible and that total subsidy payments 
cannot exceed the marginal value of environmental services provided by land of quality q 
allocated to crop j, Aj(q).  Farmers will choose the unregulated level of fertilizer use for 
each crop on each quality of land, lj(q), and a buffer strip size defined by 






j      (8) 
The government’s problem is thus to choose buffer strip size, land allocation, and total 
runoff to maximize the value of agricultural output net of damage from runoff subject to 
constraints on total runoff and land availability, 
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is set to induce farmers to allocate more land to buffer strips than is socially optimal. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis: Wheat and Barley Production in Finland 
 
We use an empirical model based on Finnish data to evaluate the social welfare 
performance of policy scenarios using area payments, fertilizer reduction subsidies or 
buffer strip payments alone or in a combination. The data come from studies performed on   12
clay soils in Southern Finland on which almost all wheat and barley production occurs. 
 
4.1 A Parametric Model of Crop Production and Environmental Services 
 
The parametric model consists of the Mitscherlich nitrogen response function for barley 
(crop 1) and wheat (crop 2), an exponential nitrogen runoff function, and a function 
characterizing social damage from nitrogen runoff. We provide a brief description here; 
additional details can be found in Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003). 
 
Nitrogen response for barley and wheat is modelled as  ) 1 (
j j l
j j j e y
β δ α
− − = , where yj is 
yield per hectare, lj is nitrogen use per hectare, and αj, βj and δj are parameters. Land 
quality is incorporated through the parameter αj in order to calibrate the nitrogen response 
function to actual yield levels corresponding to a given fertilizer use in Southern and 
South-Western Finland. The parameter αj is assumed to be linear in land quality, i.e., 
q j 1 0 μ μ α + = . The model contains 40 production units of differential land quality.  
 
The social cost of damage from nitrogen runoff is assumed to be proportional to aggregate 
nitrogen runoff, Z. The marginal cost of nitrogen runoff damage is assumed to be constant, 
D = € 3.57 per kilogram of nitrogen, and is taken from Yrjölä and Kola (2004).  Nitrogen 
runoff from any given parcel of land is a nonlinear function, 
] ) 1 ( 01 . 0 1 [ 7 . 0 5 . 0 ] 1 [
j j l m
j j e m z
− − − − = φ . The first term on the right hand side of equation, 1-
mj
0.5, models nitrogen uptake by buffer strips. The parameters are based on Finnish 
experimental studies on grass buffer strips (Uusi-Kämppä and Yläranta 1992, 1996). The 
second term, 
] ) 1 ( 01 . 0 1 [ 7 . 0 j j l m e
− − − φ , represents nitrogen runoff from crop j generated by a 
nitrogen application rate of lj per hectare when buffer strips take up a share of land mj. The 
parameter  φ calibrates this expression so that it equals the level of nitrogen runoff 
generated by a nitrogen application rate of 100 kilograms per hectare in the absence of 
buffer strips.  Data from Finnish experimental studies suggest that φ = 15 kg of nitrogen 
per hectare. (Turtola and Jaakkola 1987, Turtola and Puustinen 1998).  
 
Verification of farmers’ input use and land allocation choices is feasible but potentially 
costly. Buffer strip size and planted crop area can be verified at negligible costs and we   13
thus assume perfect, costless reporting of planted area and compliance with buffer strip 
requirements in this analysis. Nitrogen fertilizer use is typically monitored by soil nitrogen 
testing, whose cost is not negligible. The cost of such an inspection regime equals the 
probability of inspection times the cost of soil nitrogen testing, which is € 20 per hectare 
according to the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
 
Other parameter values for our parametric model are reported in Table 1. We model a 
region bordering a 2000-meter stretch of river divided into 40 parcels of equal size, so that 
each parcel has a 50 meter border along the river. The total area of arable land is assumed 
to be 40 hectares, so that each parcel extends 200 meters away from the river.  We use 
average prices of marketing year 2005 within the European Union. They may somewhat 
differ from the world market prices but, as they are used in all calculations, do not cause 
any bias when comparing policy scenarios. 
 
4.2 Policy Alternatives 
 
We use the empirical model to estimate nitrogen application rates, buffer strip widths, land 
allocations, farm profit and the social cost of damage from nitrogen runoff.  We use as a 
benchmark a social optimum consisting of farm profit plus the social value of retaining 
land in farming ( ) (q Aj , which is assumed to equal the current LFA payment for southern 
Finland, € 168 per hectare, for both crops) less nitrogen runoff damage (equation 1 in the 
theoretical model).  We use this benchmark to evaluate following three alternative 
agricultural policy and agri-environmental policy designs.  Policy 1, which corresponds to 
current EU policy, consists of an arable crop area payment without enforcement of 
environmental compliance requirements and an area payment set equal to the current LFA 
area payment in southern Finland, € 168 per hectare for wheat and barley. Policy 2 
combines optimal buffer strip payments and a subsidy for nitrogen application reduction 
with costly enforcement of nitrogen application compliance, as defined by equation 6 of 
the theoretical model. In this policy scenario total subsidy payments are fixed, so that the 
sum of crop area payments, buffer strip payments and nitrogen application reduction 
payments equals the existing LFA area payment.  Policy 3 assumes that nitrogen use is 
either unverifiable by soil nitrogen testing or just too expensive to be worthwhile, so that 
government relies solely on buffer strips to meet water quality protection goals.  Optimal 
buffer strip payments are derived under the restriction that the sum of buffer strip   14
subsidies and crop area payments is fixed at the current LFA area payment for southern 
Finland.  
 
4.3 Base Case Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize aggregate outcomes in the social optimum and under the three 
policy alternatives outlined above.  As indicated by the theoretical analysis, fertilizer 
application rates are increasing in land quality (Figure 1) while buffer strip areas are 
decreasing in land quality (Figure 2) for any given crop.  Both exhibit discrete upward 
jumps at the critical land quality at which farmers switch from barley to wheat. 
 
Note first that in the absence of environmental compliance (Policy 1) farmers use 
substantially more fertilizer than is socially optimal: about 15 percent more on barley and 
about 22 percent more on wheat (Figure 1).  Moreover, it is profitable for farmers to plant 
wheat on some land that would be planted in barley in the social optimum so that 
difference in fertilizer use on this land is even higher.  And of course it is unprofitable for 
farmers to set aside land in buffer strips hence they will not do so unless forced to.  As a 
result, nitrogen runoff under Policy 1 is over a third higher than the social optimum (Table 
2), suggesting that nitrogen pollution of surface water is a significant negative externality 
of farming in this region. 
 
The combination of fertilizer and buffer subsidies with costly enforcement (Policy 2) is 
quite successful in lowering nitrogen runoff.  Fertilizer application rates under this policy 
are only about 2 percent higher than socially optimal for barley and 4 percent higher than 
socially optimal for wheat.  Buffer strip widths are substantially higher than socially 
optimal, on the order of 27-37 percent higher for both crops, with the difference for each 
crop narrowing somewhat as land quality increases, and 30 percent higher overall.  Some 
additional reductions in overall fertilizer use and increases in overall buffer strip area are 
due to extensive margin effects: Under this policy barley is planted on some land (quality 
27) that is socially optimal to plant in wheat (Figures 1 and 2).  As a result, nitrogen runoff 
is actually lower than the social optimum by about 1 percent. 
 
The level of monitoring required to enforce compliance is quite low, averaging 0.75 
percent for barley and 1.69 percent for wheat.  The minimal probability of inspection   15
needed to ensure complete compliance is increasing in land quality, reflecting the fact that 
the gains from cheating are increasing in land quality.  Overall, however, enforcement 
costs are negligible.  The reason is straightforward.  Subsidy payments are extremely large 
relative to income from farming (and hence the additional income from cheating), so that 
it takes only a small probability of detection for the expected loss of all subsidy payments 
to equal the gains from non-compliance.  This result suggests that environmental 
compliance can be achieved at low cost even when compliance monitoring is costly, at 
least in areas where farm subsidies are already generous.  The policy modeled here 
changes the composition of subsidy payments but not the overall level of subsidies; the 
only additional cost relative to current expenditures is that of monitoring, which can be 
kept quite low because fines for those caught cheating are quite large relative to the gains 
from cheating. 
 
As one might expect from the fact that it uses two instruments to address the two 
objectives of maximizing farm income and minimizing environmental damage from 
nitrogen runoff, Policy 2 comes quite close to achieving the socially optimal welfare level, 
falling only 0.1 percent below it.  Underproduction of crops relative to the social optimum 
is balanced by overcontrol of nitrogen runoff.  The resulting net discrepancy in social 
welfare is entirely attributable to the cost of enforcement which, as noted above, is quite 
low in this case. 
 
Policy 3, in which fertilizer reduction subsidies are unenforceable (or too costly to 
enforce), features buffer strips that are substantially higher than the social optimum, about 
31 percent, but not much higher than a policy in which fertilizer reduction subsidies are 
enforceable at relatively low cost (only about 0.5 percent).  Fertilizer use is about 18 
percent higher than the social optimum.  It is slightly lower than fertilizer use in the 
absence of environmental compliance (Policy 1) because it replicates the socially optimal 
land allocation.  As a result, nitrogen runoff under this policy is only about 9 percent 
higher than the social optimum, suggesting that buffer strips are highly effective at 
reducing nitrogen runoff.  Income from crop production above the social optimum largely 
balances damage from nitrogen runoff in excess of the social optimum, so that overall 
social welfare is almost 99 percent of the social optimum. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis   16
 
The results of the base case analysis suggest that policies that provide enforceable 
subsidies for agri-environmental compliance measures while keeping total subsidy 
payments fixed at current levels can come quite close to replicating the social optimum, at 
least under Finnish conditions.  Sensitivity analysis was used to examine the relative 
performance of these policies under the conditions of greater heterogeneity in land quality 
than in Finland.  The sensitivity analysis assumed an upper bound on land quality 60 
percent higher than the base case while keeping the lowest land quality level fixed.  The 
mean yield of wheat with a 60 percent increase in maximum land quality is close to the 
highest country-level average yields in the European Union as a whole.  The results of this 
sensitivity analysis are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
With higher overall land quality, the social optimum features more land planted in wheat 
and less land planted in barley.  Higher land productivity increases both fertilizer 
productivity and the opportunity cost of land set aside from crop production, hence the 
socially optimal use of fertilizer is substantially higher and the socially optimal use of 
buffer strips is substantially lower than in the base case.  As a result, runoff in the social 
optimum is about 26 percent higher than in the base case. 
 
In the absence of environmental compliance (Policy 1), farmers’ use of fertilizer exceeds 
socially optimal levels both because of higher than optimal fertilizer application rates on 
each crop and because more land is planted to wheat than is socially optimal.  The degree 
of overuse remains about the same relative to the social optimum, however: In the absence 
of environmental compliance, fertilizer use is about 15 percent higher than the social 
optimum on barley, 22 percent higher than the social optimum on wheat, and 20 percent 
higher than the social optimum overall, while runoff is 34 percent higher than the social 
optimum. 
 
As in the base case, the combination of fertilizer and buffer subsidies with costly 
enforcement (Policy 2) is quite successful in lowering nitrogen runoff.  Fertilizer 
application rates under this policy are about 2 percent higher than socially optimal for both 
barley and wheat.  As in the base case, buffer strip widths are substantially higher than the 
social optimum, an average of 28 percent higher for barley, 18 percent higher for wheat, 
and 24 percent higher overall.  With the increase in overall land quality it becomes   17
efficient to rely relatively more on buffer strips and less on fertilizer reductions, as 
indicated by the fact that subsidy payments for buffer strips and fertilizer reductions are 
roughly equal in this scenario whereas in the base case fertilizer reduction subsidy 
payments are three times as large as buffer subsidy payments.  Also in contrast to the base 
case, the land allocation under this policy is the same as the social optimum. 
 
The level of monitoring required to enforce compliance remains quite low: The optimal 
probability of inspection averages 0.85 percent for barley, 2.86 percent for wheat, and 
2.02 percent overall.  As in the base case, the reason is again that subsidy payments are so 
large relative to crop income that it takes only a small chance of being caught to make the 
expected loss to equal the gains from cheating.  The optimal probability of inspection is 
nevertheless substantially higher than in the base case.  Higher overall land quality means 
higher returns to cheating, hence more intensive and costly enforcement.  Thus, the cost of 
enforcement is more than double that under the base case. 
 
As in the base case, the use of two instruments allows this policy to come close to 
replicating the social optimum.  Slight overproduction of crops relative to the social 
optimum is almost completely balanced by slight undercontrol of nitrogen runoff.  The 
resulting discrepancy between social welfare under this policy and that under the social 
optimum is extremely low, less than a hundredth of a percentage point.  As in the base 
case, this discrepancy is attributable to the cost of enforcement, which remains quite low 
in relative terms. 
 
Also as in the base case, Policy 3, which does not utilize fertilizer reduction subsidies, 
features buffer strips that are higher than both the social optimum.  The relative 
discrepancy between the use of buffer strips under this policy and the social optimum is 
larger than in the base case—about 41 percent in this scenario compared to 31 percent in 
the base case.  The relative difference in the use of buffer strips between this policy and 
Policy 2 is also larger, a result attributable to the higher opportunity cost of land.   
Fertilizer use under this policy is again lower than in the absence of environmental 
compliance (Policy 1) because, as in the base case, this policy replicates the socially 
optimal land allocation. Less control is exercised over nitrogen runoff is lower than in the 
base case, however: Nitrogen runoff is 15 percent higher than the social optimum in this 
scenario compared to only 9 percent higher in the base case.  Higher income from crop   18
production balances higher damage from nitrogen runoff to a slightly lesser extent than in 




There is growing interest in expanding the scope of agricultural policies to include 
environmental compliance requirements, such as incentives for providing positive 
environmental externalities from farming and reducing negative ones.  Heterogeneity of 
agricultural landscapes typically necessitates the use of spatially targeted instrument 
combinations to implement the social optimum.  Most agri-environmental policies 
considered to date in the literature are not self-enforcing, making it necessary to consider 
enforcement cost in policy design. 
 
This paper examines the optimal design of agri-environmental policies featuring two of 
the most commonly used environmental compliance requirements, reductions in fertilizer 
application rates and installation of riparian buffers, which differ in terms of compliance 
monitoring cost as well as efficacy.  Compliance with buffer strip requirements is 
verifiable at negligible cost while fertilizer application may be verifiable through costly 
monitoring, or may be verifiable only at excessive cost.  In the latter case, buffer strip 
requirements and associated payments are the only enforceable policy instrument. 
 
We develop a theoretical model of agricultural production and nitrogen runoff in a region 
with heterogeneous land quality.  We use the model to derive optimal subsidy regimes for 
buffer strips and fertilizer combined for the case where fertilizer use is verifiable at 
reasonable cost and for buffer strips alone for the case where fertilizer use is not verifiable 
at reasonable cost.  The former case requires enforcement via probabilistic monitoring 
with penalties for cheating, which we assume to be the loss of all agricultural subsidy 
payments; we derive the minimum probabilities of detection that ensure perfect 
compliance by risk neutral farmers for each quality of land.  In both regimes (as well as 
the social optimum) a fixed area payment is used to ensure that total subsidy payments 
equal the marginal value of positive amenities generated by land in agriculture, so that 
implementation of either policy means a change in budgetary outlays equal only to 
expected enforcement costs.  Both policy regimes are characterized by greater reliance on 
buffer strips and greater use of fertilizer than in the social optimum.   19
 
We examine the performance of these policies empirically using a simulation model that 
replicates conditions characteristic of Scandinavia.  Nitrogen runoff in the absence of 
environmental compliance measures is substantially higher than the social optimum.  The 
policy that combines fertilizer reduction subsidies, buffer strip payments, and random 
monitoring via soil testing performs quite well: Overcontrol of nitrogen runoff balances 
underproduction of crops almost exactly in value terms while the cost of enforcement is 
extremely low due to the fact that subsidy payments (hence losses from being caught 
cheating) are so large relative to income from crop production that infrequent monitoring 
is sufficient to deter cheating.  Buffer strip requirements are substantially higher than the 
social optimum.  The policy that relies on buffer strip payments alone also performs well, 
albeit not as well as a policy that combines buffer strip payments with fertilizer reduction 
subsidies.  Sensitivity analysis indicates that the relative performance of these policies 
remains the same as overall land quality increases. 
 
These results suggest that reorienting current European agricultural policies away from 
income supports toward payments for environmental improvements can achieve 
significant improvements in environmental quality with small, if any increases in overall 
spending by substituting payments for buffer strips, fertilizer reductions, and similar 
measures for portions of current area payments.  Heterogeneity of land quality and the 
resulting need for targeted subsidies did not prove to be a significant obstacle in the cases 
considered here.  It would be interesting to examine whether these results carry over to 
situations featuring greater diversity of crops and land quality    20
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 Table 1. Parameter values used in the numerical application.  
Parameter Symbol  Value 
Price of barley  p1 €  0.101/kg 
Price of wheat  p2 €  0.111/kg 
Price of nitrogen fertilizer 
Expenditure for other inputs than fertilizer 
 
Social value of retaining land in agriculture:  







          € 161/ha 
          € 182/ha 
 
€ 168/ha  
















3842 - 5460 
0.0105 
0.7624 
     
Nitrogen runoff at average nitrogen use  φ   15 kg/ha 
Cost of soil testing  T  € 20/ha 
Establishment cost for buffer strip  γ €  107/ha 
 
Notes: Prices are from the year 2005. The price of nitrogen is calculated on the basis of a 
compound NPK fertilizer.  
Sources: Bäckman et al. 1997, Turtola and Jaakkola 1987, Simmelsgaard 1991. 
 Table 2. Fertilizer Application, Buffer Strip Area, Crop Production, and Nitrogen Runoff under Alternative Policies 
 





Runoff (kg)  Barley Wheat 
Base Case 
Social Optimum  82,854  53,222  3589  0.87  468 
Area Payments with No Environmental 
Compliance 
85,281 62,098  4256  0  632 
Fertilizer Subsidies with Costly 
Enforcement plus Buffer Strip Subsidies 
86,272 49,807  3642  1.13  463 
Buffer Strip Subsidies Only  86,528  56,538  4232  1.14  512 
Maximum Land Quality 60% Higher than Base Case 
Social Optimum  57,886  140,444  4534  0.49  592 
Area Payments with No Environmental 
Compliance 
57,075 155,010  5458  0  792 
Fertilizer Subsidies with Costly 
Enforcement plus Buffer Strip Subsidies 
57,928 141,083  4616  0.61  593 
Buffer Strip Subsidies Only  65,067  143,534  5429  0.69  679 
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Subsidy Payments  Monitoring 
Cost 
Social 







Social  Optimum  3376  1684 0  0 6720  0 8418 
Area Payments with No Environmental 
Compliance 
3644  2256 0  0 6720  0 8108 
Fertilizer Subsidies with Costly 
Enforcement plus Buffer Strip Subsidies 
3349 1652  408  142  6170  8  8409 
Buffer Strip Subsidies Only  3418  1828  0  410  6310  0  8309 
Maximum Land Quality 60% Higher than Base Case 
Social Optimum  9144  2115  0  0  6720  0  13749 
Area Payments with No Environmental 
Compliance 
9456 2828  0  0  6720  0  13348 
Fertilizer Subsidies with Costly 
Enforcement plus Buffer Strip Subsidies 
9143  2117 281  283 6156 16 13746 
Buffer Strip Subsidies Only  9242  2424  0  324  6396  0  13538 
 


































































































Figure 2.  Buffer Strip Area on Different Qualities of Land 